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ABSTRACT                 JEL  J3, J7 
 
Relative employment conditions have changed across the public and private sectors in Britain over 
the last decade with the former becoming a more attractive earnings option. Using new linked 
employee-employer data for Britain in 2004, this paper shows that, on average, full-time male 
public sector employees earn 11.7 log wage points more than their private sector counterparts. 
Decomposition analysis reveals that the majority of this pay premium is associated with public 
sector employees having individual characteristics associated with higher pay and to their working 
in higher paid occupations. Whilst there is some evidence of workplace segregation in the private 
sector, there is little indication that rates of return vary across the earnings distribution for either 
public or private sector employees. It no longer appears to be the case that the public sector 
provides a refuge for the low skilled at the expense of the highly educated. Furthermore, working 
conditions appear more uniform in the public sector and, unlike the private sector, there is no 
significant penalty associated with ethnic background.  
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I.  Introduction 
 
 “The ASHE figures [showing that median earnings for full time workers in the 
public sector rose 4.1% to £475 a week in 2005 compared with 2.5% to £ 413 in 
the private sector] indicate that the Chancellor can now make a strong case for 
taking a tougher stance on public sector pay”. (John Philpott, Chief Economist 
at the Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development, cited in  The 
Guardian, November 11, 2005). 
 
“The Government says the public sector gets better pensions in compensation 
for lower pay. Today’s evidence shows how they get better pensions and better 
pay”, (David Willetts, Shadow Trade and Industry Secretary, cited in The 
Guardian, November 11, 2005). 
 
“I can assure you that through the vigilance of the Bank and our determination 
to ensure future public sector pay settlements are founded on our 2% inflation 
target, we will maintain our anti-inflation discipline,” (Gordon Brown, 
Chancellor, cited in  The Guardian, June 21, 2006). 
 
 
The public sector wage bill is a matter of great concern to policy makers contributing 
as it does nearly 50% of government spending1 and employing a third of the total 
U.K. workforce. A significant part of the Chancellor's Comprehensive Spending 
Review is focused on public sector pay and implications for the public sector 
workforce in the long run. Concerns have also been expressed about the recent 
increases in the public-private wage differential.  
 
The public sector pay bill is far from stable over time. Trinder (1997) argues 
that there are large oscillations in the public sector pay bill and that the movements in 
private/public wage relativities are pro-cyclical (using data from the New Earnings 
Survey, NES). Disney and Gosling (1998, using data from the General Household 
Survey and the British Household Panel Survey) argue that despite these oscillations, 
the average public sector pay gap was approximately the same at the end of the 1990s 
(in 1994 male public sector hourly earnings were 14 per cent higher than their private 
sector counterparts) as it was at the end of the 1970s. During these two decades 
                                                 
1 There are six Pay Review Bodies for public sector employees, which have specific remit groups. In 
addition the Office of Manpower Economics (OME) services the Police Negotiating Board.  They are 
all serviced independently by OME.  The current aggregate pay bill of these covered groups is over £50 
billion. Given GDP for 2002 is £ 1043 billion of which 56% is employee compensation (Annual 
Abstract 2004), the covered group payment represents 5% of GNP and 8.5% of all labour income. 
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changes in the occupational composition across sectors led to a decline in the public 
sector pay gap, especially so for men. Once they allow for changes in the age and 
qualifications of the workforces over time, Disney and Gosling (1998; page 354) 
report a public sector pay gap for men of only 1% in the 1990s (in contrast, to the 
14% gap they report for women).   
 
Bender and Elliot (1999) use the New Earnings Survey (NES) and the British 
Household Panel Survey (BHPS) to investigate pay convergence across the public and 
private sectors. Their main conclusion (using the usual decomposition analysis) is of 
divergence between returns to sector-specific occupational characteristics. Elliot et al. 
(1999) investigate public/private sector wages in the five largest EU states and 
Sweden. They also conclude that it is vital to allow fully for different returns to 
occupation, however, they note that a major difficulty is in identifying occupations 
where both private and public sector employees are present in large numbers. Studies 
which divide the sample (in some way) between high and low salaried employees 
could expect to find a positive pay premium for low earners in the public sector, 
especially so if males and females are considered together and if occupations are not 
fully allowed for.  
 
Yu et al (2005) using data from the BHPS throughout the 1990s find the 
chances of earning a higher salary are greater for well paid employees in the private 
sector and vice versa for the lowly paid in the public sector. They only include years 
of schooling, work experience and an indicator variable for public sector employment 
as explanatory variables. Luciflora and Meurs (2006) compare the public sector pay 
gap across, Britain, France and Italy (for Britain they use data from the Labour Force 
Survey, LFS, in 1998). They also conclude that the pay gap is highest for low salary 
earners in the public sector and argue that differences in unobserved characteristics 
may be more important for these employees. It is clearly important to be able to 
control for potentially very diverse labour forces in the two sectors. 
 
Another major difference between the public and private sectors in Britain is 
the nature of the wage setting process. For example, there are considerable disparities 
in the extent of trade union representation in wage negotiations, the presence of wage 
setting boards in the public sector, and the presence of incentive pay schemes across 
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the sectors. Makepeace and Marcenaro-Gutierrez (2006) also use data from the 
Labour Force Survey (LFS) to study public sector pay relativities, distinguishing 
between public servants covered by Pay Review Boards and those uncovered groups 
using SOC. They find that covered public sector workers do better than uncovered 
(and that the extent of this premium varies enormously by occupation). The authors 
have no other information on the nature of the covered and uncovered workplaces, 
however, and so can provide limited alternative possible explanations.  
 
Burgess and Metcalfe (1999) use the 1990 Workplace Industrial Relations 
Survey (WIRS90) to explore incentive schemes across public and private sector 
workplaces. Controlling for occupational type they find that incentive schemes are 
much rarer in the public sector for higher skilled occupations. Burgess and Ratto 
(2003) survey international evidence to further explore the impact of explicit 
incentives (and especially Performance Review Pay, PRP) in the public sector. They 
conclude that these practices are typically under utilised in the public sector. A 
strength of these studies is the recognition that workplace characteristics are not 
uniform across the sectors. To be able to fully consider the association between 
payment schemes such as these and the resultant public sector pay gap for individual 
employees, however, it is necessary to use linked employee and workplace data.  
 
More recent studies suggest a rise in public sector pay relative to private sector 
in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Makepeace and Marcenaro-Gutierrez (2006; page 
6) argue that, with the exception of the armed forces, all the public sector occupations 
covered by pay review bodies saw a growth in their real earnings between 1999 and 
2003. This is perhaps not surprising given the emphasis placed on public service 
performance by the Labour government after its success in the 2001 general election. 
“a [public sector] staff reinvigorated through more attractive and flexible pay and 
conditions. For the first time in nearly a decade, public sector pay is now rising faster 
than private sector pay” Tony Blair (Speech by the Prime Minister Tony Blair on  
Public Services reform2, 25/1/2002). This suggests it also necessary to use recent data 
when exploring the public sector earnings gap. 
 
                                                 
2 As cited on http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page3008.asp, 26/3/2007. 
 
 
5
The data used in this study are drawn from the British Workplace Employee 
Relations Survey 2004 (WERS04) which is a nationally representative survey of both 
workplaces and their employees. The linked nature (and extensive questionnaires) of 
WERS04 data allows us to control far more extensively for both individual employee 
characteristics and workplace characteristics than has been possible in previous 
earnings studies. A further attractive feature of the WERS04 data, of particular 
relevance to our study, is the extensive information it provides on both public and 
private sector workplaces (Kersley et al, 2006, page 5).  
 
Most studies concentrating on the public-private wage differential issue rely 
on the human capital model as the theoretical basis for the study of earnings (Becker 
1962 and 1964).  This approach is also used as the starting point in this paper. At the 
employee level, it is assumed that wages increase with (marginal) productivity which 
in turn increases with measures of accumulated skills such as education, work 
experience, and training. The Human Capital approach is necessarily partial. Relying 
on age and education outcomes as measures of potential productivity have many well 
known limitations, particularly so for women (Becker, 1962 and 1964). Nickel and 
Quintini (2002), using evidence from age 10 and 11 test scores from the National 
Child Development Survey (NCDS) and the NES, argue that a decline in public sector 
relative to private sector pay adversely affects the quality of males in the public 
sector, but not females. Their paper emphasises the need to control fully for the 
individual characteristics of public sector employees, but also raises the question of 
why the different genders may respond differently to the characteristics of public 
sector workplaces. 
 
 Other factors also affect the marginal productivity of workers. Principally 
these other factors derive from the nature of the job that an individual does and from 
the workplace that they work in. The further contribution of our study over the 
existing literature is to also consider the potential impact of the workplace on the 
public sector pay gap.  
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2.  Wage Determination in the Private and Public Sectors 
 
The process of wage determination in any organisation is complex. There are many 
and sometimes conflicting effects to consider. The most general statement that 
economists can make is that in the private sector populated by profit maximising 
firms, there is a close relationship between the wage and the marginal product of 
labour. The exact nature of this relationship depends on market conditions. Under full 
blown labour market competition, the wage will equal the marginal product of labour 
as in the classical textbook account. In the public sector (and in the not-for-profit 
sector) there is no obvious reason why the link between marginal product and wage 
should be so strong. Nonetheless, so long as public sector organisations do have well 
defined objectives, then cost minimising considerations will also require them to take 
account of the productivity of workers in setting wage rates. 
 
The factors which determine the marginal productivity function can be broadly 
divided into two types. First, there are those which are wrapped up in the individual 
worker: accumulated human capital, motivation, and so on. Secondly, there are those 
which are due to the workplace environment that the worker finds him/herself in: the 
level and quality of capital and other complementary inputs and the industrial 
relations environment for example. A favourable change in any of these will cause the 
marginal product function to be higher than it would have been without the favourable 
change. 
 
The wage rate also depends on the labour market conditions facing the firm. 
Other things being equal, wages set under monopsony conditions will be lower (for 
the same MPL function) than under competition. From the point of view of a cross 
section econometric analysis, the comparative static proposition that can most 
usefully guide the estimation will be of the type: If worker B has a higher level of 
human capital than worker A, and if the supply conditions of type A workers and type 
B workers is the same and if both workers are in the same working environment 
(including the degree of market power enjoyed by their employers), then the wage of 
B should be higher than that of A.  
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Similarly, if the focus was on firm specific characteristics rather than worker 
characteristics, then the equivalent proposition would be: If worker B is employed in a 
firm with a higher level of capital than worker A’s firm, but both firms enjoy equal 
market power, and if the supply conditions of type A workers and type B workers is 
the same and if both workers have the same level of human capital, then the wage of 
B should be higher than that of A. 
 
The diagram below illustrates in the case of perfect competition. 
 
 
 
Figure1.  Wage Determination under Perfect Competition 
Under perfect competition and equal supply conditions, the only source of wage 
variation between A and B is to do with higher marginal product functions whether 
these are due to B’s extra human capital or B’s employers extra capital stock as 
illustrated above. 
 
Typically, the econometric study of wage determination – the earnings 
function approach – has been based on data in which only workers have been 
sampled, e.g. the LFS. The typical variables thought to capture human capital and 
skill, i.e. education, experience, tenure, etc. have been used as explanatory variables 
in regressions in which the endogenous variable is a suitable measure of earnings. 
MPL A 
MPL B 
WA 
    WB 
Equal Supply Conditions for 
Type A and B workers 
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Essentially, in terms of our diagram above, all variations in marginal product of 
labour functions are attributed to worker characteristics. Though these studies have 
provided valuable insights into the factors determining wages, they are necessarily 
limited because they are unable to take into account the potential sources of variation 
in MPL functions due to variations in the working environments of different workers. 
In other words, the role of workplace specific variables (which impinge on the MPL 
functions of all workers employed in the workplace) cannot be estimated, unlike in 
our analysis. 
 
3. The Data 
The data used in this study are drawn from the British Workplace Employee Relations 
Survey 2004 (WERS04)3. WERS04 is a nationally representative survey of 
workplaces with 5 or more employees4. (A workplace comprises the activities of a 
single employer at a single set of premises.) Face-to-face interviews for WERS2004 
were conducted with a senior manager (with day-to-day responsibility for employee 
relations). At those workplaces responding to the manager survey, a questionnaire 
was presented to 25 randomly selected employees (in workplaces with more than 5 
employees) or to all the employees (in workplaces with fewer than 26 employees). 
The entire surveying process resulted in 2,295 completed workplace surveys, with 
22,451 completed employee questionnaires from 1,733 of these workplaces. 
Concentrating on male full-time employees leaves us data for 6,695 employees (1489 
from the public sector and 5206 from the private).  
  
A full list of the worker characteristic variables and the workplace specific 
variables, together with definitions is provided in the appendix (see Table A1). 
WERS04 is a stratified random sample, and larger workplaces and some industries are 
over-represented.  Thus, all of the empirical results that follow use workplace and 
employee sampling weights where possible.  Brief sample based summary statistics 
are presented in Table 1 for the public sector (columns one and two), and private 
sector employees (column three and four).  
                                                 
3Department of Trade and Industry  (2006). Workplace Employee Relations Survey: Cross-Section, 
2004 (computer file). 5th ed. Colchester: The Data Archive (distributor). SN: 5294.  
4 The industries excluded from the survey were agriculture, hunting and forestry; fishing; mining and 
quarrying; private households with employed persons; and extra-territorial organisations and bodies. 
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The variable of major interest is the hourly wage variable W for employee i  in 
workplace j. Hourly earnings are calculated for each employee by dividing their gross 
(before tax and other deductions) weekly wages by the hours they usually work each 
week (including any overtime and extra hours). The data do not give the actual value 
of gross weekly wages but rather the interval to which the wage belongs for each 
sampled worker, there are 14 bands. In our regression analysis, the mid-point of the 
interval is used as the measure of weekly wages.5 Usual hours worked is a continuous 
measure. The subsequent hourly wage measure, Wij, is the ratio of weekly wages to 
usual hours and is therefore continuous. 
 
We find that public sector full-time males earn some 8.9% more than do their 
private sector employees (Table 1, row one) and that there is considerably more 
variance in public than in private sector pay. Comparing log wages, as is more 
common in the literature, public sector employees earn 11.7 log wage points (lwp or 
11.7 log per cent) more than private sector employees. This is the raw earnings gap 
that will be explored further.  
 
 As discussed above, the majority of authors have adopted the human capital 
model as the theoretical basis for the earnings function (an extensive recent survey is 
provided in Chiswick, 2003). This approach is also used in this paper. At the 
employee level, it is assumed that wages increase with measures of accumulated skills 
such as education, work experience, and training.  The public sector sample displays 
higher levels for all of these categories (35.5% have a degree or postgraduate 
qualification compared to 24.7% of the private sector employees; they have on 
average 2.3 more years of experience and 1.2 days more training in the previous year; 
they are also almost 9% more likely to have a vocational qualification). Public sector 
employees are much more likely to be in the professional, technical, clerical and 
                                                 
5In unreported results, we address the possibility that this banding may affect our results. Using interval 
regression techniques, we find, however, no significant difference from the more general OLS 
regression results reported in the text. 
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personal services occupations whilst the private sector has more managers, craftsmen, 
salesmen, and operative-assembly workers.  
 
 Further categories of explanatory variables are also included. These are 
demographic variables (which may constrain an individual’s choice of jobs such as 
the presence of dependent children, marital status, race and disability); job 
characteristics (being on a fixed term contract, current job tenure, and union 
membership); and workplace-specific characteristics (we allow the workplace to have 
a fixed-effect impact on the productivity of individual employees and thus on the 
earnings function).  
 
 Reading across the columns in Table 1, we can see that full-time male public 
servants are more likely to be married, have a dependent child, be disabled and not be 
from an ethnic minority. They are also more likely to be on a fixed term contract, 
have longer current job tenure, and be a union member. The differences in union 
membership rates are striking: 74% for the public sector and 23% for the private. 
 
4.  Econometric Methodology 
We start by establishing a base line regression which uses individual worker 
characteristics only. For clarity we focus on earnings outcomes for full-time males, 
not least because the impact of gender may well be conflated with the issue of 
workplace-specific effects. Using semi-logarithmic wage equations, we estimate: 
εββα ijijkijij kX+X+=W ++ )(...)1(1    (1)    
where Wii is the natural log of the wage for individual i in workplace j;  α is an 
intercept term;  Xij is a vector of k regressors capturing the individual characteristics 
expected to have an impact on wages; and ε ij  is a residual term. We call this our 
baseline model and estimate it using ordinary least squares (allowing for the sample 
survey weights) for both public sector and private sector full-time male employees. 
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Having established the baseline, we then allow for workplace specific fixed 
effects in the simplest possible way by re-estimating (1) using a fixed effects model:  
εββα ijijkijjij kX+X+=W ++∂+ )(...)1(1     (2) 
where j again represents the workplace and δj the workplace specific effect6. Note the 
considerable loss in degrees of freedom in moving from (1) to (2) due to the number 
of workplace specific effects  
 
5.  Results. 
Table 2 reports the baseline estimates of our earnings function in columns 2 and 3 and 
the estimates including workplace specific fixed effects in columns 4 and 5. The test 
of the explanatory power of the regressors is clearly significant for all the regressions. 
Overall, the parameter estimates are generally well defined and have the expected 
sign. 
 
 Beginning with the baseline regressions, the returns from experience and 
higher qualifications are positive for all employees and they are higher in the private 
sector than in the public sector. It should be remembered that these statements are 
relative in nature. For example, the returns to education in each sector are measured 
relative to the omitted education category; in this case, “education none or other” 
(which we treat as our base). The average log hourly pay for this education level is 
1.99 in the private sector and 2.08 in the public (they constitute 27.7 per cent of the 
private sector workforce and 21.7 per cent of the public). As the comparison group is 
lower paid in the private sector we might expect to see larger rates of return for higher 
education levels in this sector. The returns from extra days of training and vocational 
qualifications are also positive for all employees but are only significantly related to 
wage increase in the private sector.  
 
                                                 
6 The workplace specific effect δj also captures unobservable individual effects common to all 
employees in a workplace. It is not possible to identify the remaining idiosyncratic effects and we 
relegate them to the residual. This will have no consequence for the estimate of δj if the remaining 
individual effects are uncorrelated with these included workplace specific effects. 
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The returns from being in the upper end occupations (managerial, professional 
and technical) rather than clerical are all higher in the public sector. The average log 
hourly pay for clerks is 2.17 in the public sector and 2.26 in the private and so we 
might expect to see higher returns for better paid occupations in the public sector. In 
the private sector there is a clear break in the return to occupation with craft, personal 
services, salesmen, operative and assembly workers and the unskilled earning less 
than clerks.  
 
There is no significant difference in the returns to being married across the 
two sectors, with all full-time men enjoying higher wages if they are married. Public 
sector men earn significantly more if they have a child, however. There are also two 
more significant wages associations in the private sector that are not apparent in the 
public: members of ethnic minorities earn less and trade union members earn more. 
 
Employees form ethnic minorities earn more than others in the public sector 
(although with low significance levels) and substantially less than others in the private 
sector. Being a trade union member is not associated with significantly higher 
earnings in the public service (despite the high membership rates recorded in this 
sector) but is associated with 5.5% higher earnings in the private sector.  
 
The introduction of workplace specific fixed effects (columns 4 and 5 of Table 
2) has little impact on the public sector results. There is some reduction in the returns 
from low levels of education but the return for higher qualifications (degree and 
postgraduate) show little change. The relationship with the demographic 
characteristics of the workers (having a child, being married, being disabled or a 
member of an ethic minority) and the wage also show no significant change.  There is 
some slight decline in the wage returns for the highest occupations in the public sector 
but again not significantly so. These results suggest that there is very little workplace 
segregation amongst public servants or, alternatively, that the introduction of 
workplace specific characteristics does not have an impact on the relationship 
between the individual characteristics of the workers and their wages in the public 
sector in aggregate. There is one major exception; the wage premium enjoyed by 
those considering themselves to be ethnic is no longer significant, suggesting that 
these employees are concentrated in high paying workplaces. 
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In contrast, introducing workplace specific fixed effects into the private sector 
earnings function is associated with a removal of the positive relationship between 
training and wages; the positive returns from higher education levels are reduced; and 
the union wage gap becomes significantly negative.  These results suggest that there is 
segregation of high paid workers into high paying workplaces and vice versa in the 
private sector. The union impact is particularly striking: the results suggest that 
individual union membership is actually associated with 4.7% less earnings once 
workplace effects have been fully allowed for. The returns to education, especially for 
postgraduates, are now lower in the private sector than the in public sector, as is the 
returns to a vocational qualification.  
 
6. Decomposing the earnings gaps. 
Following Oaxaca and Ransom (1994), in general, the decomposition of the mean 
earnings gap between groups of employees in the public sector (pu) and the private 
sector (pr) is calculated as: 
 
)ˆˆ()ˆˆ(ˆ)( prpuprpuprpuprpuprpu XXXWW ααβββ −+−+−=−    (3) 
 
In this calculation puprpu XX βˆ)( − captures the impact of the difference in the value of 
the regressors weighted by the parameters from the model for the public sector pu, 
and )ˆˆ()ˆˆ( prpuprpuprX ααββ −+−  is the remaining unexplained gap. We further 
decompose the regressors into two types: individual characteristics; and occupations. 
The decompositions are presented in Table 3.  
 
 As discussed above, the earnings gap between public and private sector 
employees is 11.7 per cent: Male full-time public sector employees earn 11.7 per cent 
more on average than do male full-time private sector employees. All figures are 
expressed in log-percentage points. This earnings gap can be decomposed into the 
component explained by differences in the mean values of their individual 
characteristics which make up 8.01 per cent; an occupational component of 2.42 per 
cent; and an unexplained component of 1.29 per cent. The three components summing 
to the earnings gap of 11.73 per cent.  
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 It would seem that the higher hourly wages public sector males earn over 
private sector males primarily reflect the relatively more productive characteristics the 
former group possesses (or, at least, characteristics associated with higher hourly pay) 
and the higher paid occupations they are more likely to occur in. There is a relatively 
small unexplained component in their earnings gap. 
 
When workplace specific fixed effects are included in the estimation, private 
sector employees can be seen to gain because they are more likely to be employed in a 
higher paying workplace (3.10 per cent). The decompositions otherwise show little 
change (panel 2 of Table 3): the component due to individual characteristics stays 
very similar at 8.59 per cent; the component associated with public sector employees 
being more concentrated in higher paying occupations increases to 4.46 per cent; and 
the unexplained component is 1.77 per cent.  
 
7. Looking across the earnings distribution. 
As discussed above, earnings in the public sector declined over 1980s and the 1990s 
relative to those in the private sector (Makepeace and Marcenaro-Gutierrez, 2006). 
This was especially true for those in the upper earning levels; typically the full-time, 
well educated men. The implied relative wage compression in the public sector has 
been found in several studies suggesting that standard OLS analysis, which is based 
on the conditional mean of the distribution, may not be the most suitable (Poterba and 
Rueben, 1994). A series of papers for the UK have used quantile regression 
estimation to explore the earnings gap across the earnings distribution (Disney and 
Gosling, 1998; Blackaby et al, 1999; Yu et al, 2005; Luicflora and Meurs, 2006).  The 
results show (i) a fall in the premium associated with public sector employment at the 
lower income levels; and (ii) increasingly negative returns for the highest income 
earners throughout the 1990s (Yu et al, 2005; 371). Studies that included measures of 
education also found the returns to education for male graduates clearly declining at 
the higher income levels (Disney and Gosling, 1998; page 372). 
 
 Tables 4 and 5 present results from quantile regressions for WER2004. In the 
public sector (Table 4), the highest returns for education are generally found to occur 
in the middle regions of the earnings distribution (between the 40th and the 60th 
quantiles).  This is true for both the high and low educated employees. In contrast, 
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private sector employees with post-graduate qualifications have declining rates of 
return at higher income levels (Table 5). These results are very different to those 
referred to above and may be due to recent relative wage gains in the public sector.  
 
 To compare the estimates for the individual quantiles directly, Table 6 reports 
differences in simultaneously estimated parameters (and associated confidence 
measures) between the 80th and 20th, and the 90th and 10th quantiles, respectively, in 
the two sectors. These results show very little difference in the parameters across 
these densities. In the private sector, the returns to training increases with higher 
earnings, whilst returns to the managerial, operative and unskilled occupations decline 
in the private sector with higher earnings. In the public sector the returns associated 
with having a dependent child and a vocational qualification increase with higher 
earnings, whilst those associated with longer tenure and being a craftsman decline. 
There is no evidence suggesting relatively higher or lower returns from being a trade 
union member across the earnings distribution.  
 
There is limited evidence of ethnic minority employees being rewarded more 
at higher income levels in both sectors, although only at weak significance levels. In 
both sectors, there is, however, evidence that the unskilled earn less at higher income 
earnings and this penalty is surprisingly similar in the two sectors.  
 
Conclusions. 
Public sector employees enjoyed an 11.7 log wage point earnings premium over their 
private sector counterparts in Britain in 2004. Higher educated private sector 
employees receive a higher rate of return for education than do their public servants 
counterparts. However, the highest paid occupations in the public sector receive a 
higher return than those in the private sector, once education is allowed for. Ethnic 
minority employees are also found to earn considerably more in the public service and 
considerably less in the private sector. 
 
Introducing workplace specific fixed effects has little impact on the 
parameters for the public sector suggesting that workplace characteristics are not 
strongly related to the individual characteristics that are associated with wages in this 
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sector. With the exception of ethnic employees indicating that ethnic public servants 
are concentrated in high paying workplaces.  
 
In the private sector there is evidence of high wage workers being 
concentrated in high wage workplaces and vice versa and that this concentration is 
associated with earnings potential. For example, once the workplace specific effects 
are allowed for, being a union member is associated with a wage fall. Similarly, the 
fall in the parameters on training and higher education levels may indicate some 
segregation of high wage workers into high productivity workplaces.   
 
Nevertheless, decomposition analysis shows that the majority of the public 
sector pay premium is associated with public servants being more likely to have 
individual characteristics associated with higher pay and to their working in higher 
paid occupations. 
 
Comparative quantile analysis does not support earlier results suggesting 
lower returns for well educated public servants at higher income levels (or higher 
returns for the unskilled at low income levels). We find the returns to education in the 
public sector are generally highest in the middle of the earnings distribution. In 
contrast, the returns to the highest educated and to managers declines in the private 
sector with higher earnings. The penalty for being unskilled is higher in the private 
sector but increases across the earnings distribution by a similar amount in both 
sectors. 
 
Our results from this preliminary analysis suggest that relative employment 
conditions have changed across the public and private sectors in Britain over the last 
decade with the former becoming a more attractive earnings option. It no longer 
appears to be the case that the public service provides a refuge for the low skilled at 
the expense of highly educated. Furthermore, working conditions are more uniform in 
the public sector and there is no penalty associated with belonging to an ethnic 
minority. In future work, we are developing these ideas and exploring more fully the 
relative employment conditions of the highest education and highest paid occupations 
across the two sectors. We are also addressing the gender pay gap across the sectors. 
 
 
 
17
References 
Bayard, K., Hellerstein, J., Neumark. D. and Troske, K. 2003. “New Evidence of Sex 
Segregation and Sex Differences in Wages from Matched Employee-
Employer Data.” Journal of Labor Economics 21(4), 887-922. 
Blackaby, D. Murphy, P. and O’Leary, N. 1999. “The Payment of Public Sector 
Workers in the UK: Reconciliation with North-American Findings.” 
Economics Letters 65, 239-243. 
Bender K.A and Elliot, R (1999) “ Relative Earnings in the UK Public Sector: The 
Impact of pay Reform on Pay Structure” in Public Sector Pay Determination 
in the European Union, ed. by Elliot, R, Lucifora, C and Meurs, D, Macmillan 
1999 
Burgess, S and Metcalfe, D (1999), “ The Use of Incentive Schemes in the public and 
private sectors: evidence from British Establishments”, CMPO Working Paper 
99/015 
Burgess, S  and Ratto, M (2003), “The Role of Incentives in the Public Sector: Issues 
and Evidence”, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol.19, No. 2, pp 285-
300 
Chiswick, B.R. 2003.  “Jacob Mincer, Experience and the Distribution of Earnings.”  
IZA Discussion Paper No. 847, Bonn.  
Deaton, A. 1998. The Analysis of Household Surveys. A Microeconometric Approach 
to Development Policy. World Bank. John Hopkins University Press, 
Baltimore. 
Department of Trade and Industry. 2006. Workplace Employee Relations Survey: 
Cross-Section, 2004 (computer file). 5th ed. Colchester: The Data Archive 
(distributor), 2006. SN: 5294.  
Disney, R. and Gosling, A. 1998. “Does it Pay to Work in the Public Sector?” Fiscal 
Studies 19(4); 347-374. 
Kersley, B. Alpin, C. Forth, J. Bryson, A. Bewley, H. Dix, G. and Oxenbridge, S. 
2006. Inside the Workplace: First Findings from the 2004 Workplace 
Employment Relations Survey. 
Luciflora, C. and Meurs, D. 2006. “The Public Sector Pay Gap in France, Great 
Britain and Italy.” Review of Income and Wealth 52(1); 43- 59. 
 
 
18
Makepeace, G and Marcenaro, O. 2006. “The Earnings of Workers Covered by Pay 
Review Bodies: Evidence from the Labour Force Survey” Report for the office 
of Manpower Economics, http://www.ome.uk.com/research.cfm 
Millward, N., Woodland, S., Bryson, A., Forth, J., Kirby, S., and Stokes, L.  2006.  
“A Bibliography of Research Based on the British Workplace Industrial 
Relations Survey Series.”  London:  National Institute for Economic and 
Social Research.  
Mumford, K. and Smith, P.N. 2004. "The Gender Earnings Gap in Britain: Equal Pay 
versus Comparable Worth."  IZA Discussion Paper 1109. 
Neumark, D. 1988. “Employer’s Discriminatory Behaviour and the Estimation of 
Wage Discrimination.” Journal of Human Resources 23(3): 279-295. 
Nickel, S and Quintini, G . 2002. “ The Consequences of the Decline in Public Sector 
Pay in Britain: A Little Bit of Evidence”, Economic Journal, Vol. 112, 
No.477, pp F85-F118 
Oaxaca, R.L., and Ransom, M.R. 1994. “On Discrimination and the Decomposition of 
Wage Differentials.” Journal of Econometrics 61: 5-24. 
Poterba, J. and Reubens, K. 1994. “The Distribution of Public Sector Wage Premia: 
Evidence Using Quantile Regression Methods” National Bureau of Economic 
Research, WP 4734. 
Trinder, C  (1997), “Public Sector Pay” in Dan Corry ed. Public Expenditure, Dryden 
Press, 1997. 
Yu, K. Vam Kerm, P. and Zhang, J. 2005. “Bayesian Quantile Regression: An 
Application to the Wage Distribution in 1990s Britain.” The Indian Journal of 
Statistics 67(2); 359-377. 
 
 
 
 
19
Table 1. Descriptive statistics: public and private sector full-time males.  
 
  public sector  private sector 
  mean s.e. mean s.e.
hourly pay  10.970 0.22  10.073 0.15
ln(hourly pay)  2.315 0.02  2.198 0.02
potential experience (years)  26.223 0.41  23.907 0.27
training days (previous year)  3.564 0.16  2.334 0.07
education measures;     
     none  0.144 0.01  0.219 0.01
     other  0.062 0.01  0.071 0.00
     cse25  0.088 0.01  0.119 0.01
     cse1  0.215 0.01  0.219 0.01
    gceae  0.046 0.01  0.042 0.00
    gce2ae  0.079 0.01  0.069 0.00
    degree  0.241 0.02  0.188 0.01
    postgrad  0.114 0.01  0.059 0.01
vocational qualification  0.670 0.02  0.582 0.01
child  0.452 0.02  0.412 0.01
married  0.754 0.01  0.695 0.01
disabled  0.137 0.01  0.120 0.01
ethnic  0.043 0.01  0.058 0.01
fixed term  0.034 0.01  0.022 0.00
tenure  6.340 0.16  5.331 0.09
union  0.736 0.02  0.229 0.01
occupation categories;    
     managerial   0.115 0.01  0.169 0.01
     professional  0.161 0.02  0.105 0.01
     technical  0.241 0.02  0.110 0.01
     clerical  0.123 0.02  0.064 0.00
     craft   0.095 0.02  0.174 0.01
     personal   0.061 0.01  0.014 0.00
     sales   0.006 0.00  0.044 0.01
     operative   0.055 0.01  0.189 0.01
     unskilled  0.143 0.02  0.132 0.01
       
observations  1489   5206  
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Table 2. Baseline and FE regressions: public and private sector full-time males. 
 
 
 
 
  Baseline OLS  With workplace specific effects 
ln(hourly pay)  public sector  private sector  public sector  private sector 
  coeff t-value  coeff t-value  coeff t-value  coeff t-value
potential experience (years)  0.018 5.14  0.027 12.03  0.013 3.78  0.022 10.29
potential exper sqd. (x103)  -0.217 -3.11  -0.419 -9.56  -0.167 -2.45  -0.341 -8.55
training (days previous year)  0.002 0.58  0.006 2.64  0.004 1.12  0.000 -0.08
educ none/other is omitted           
     cse25  0.114 3.33  0.077 4.02  0.062 1.80  0.061 3.44
     cse1  0.139 5.99  0.114 5.88  0.109 4.01  0.074 4.41
    gceae  0.094 1.19  0.126 3.89  0.059 1.12  0.115 4.74
    gce2ae  0.229 6.91  0.256 9.71  0.148 4.49  0.199 8.50
    degree  0.288 9.61  0.376 14.75  0.233 8.03  0.243 11.76
    postgrad  0.491 9.37  0.528 14.46  0.429 7.00  0.338 11.19
vocational qualification  0.031 1.57  0.030 2.19  0.048 2.54  0.034 3.17
child  0.053 2.63  0.026 1.99  0.058 2.60  0.015 1.51
married  0.061 2.80  0.077 5.28  0.058 2.54  0.069 5.56
disabled  -0.032 -1.56  -0.025 -1.48  -0.012 -0.54  -0.012 -0.83
ethnic  0.093 1.76  -0.075 -2.37  -0.010 -0.25  -0.059 -2.12
fixed term  0.058 1.29  -0.100 -1.60  0.024 0.57  -0.111 -1.99
tenure  0.014 4.71  0.012 5.69  0.014 4.45  0.011 6.73
union  -0.013 -0.58  0.055 2.86  0.008 0.32  -0.047 -2.87
clerical is omitted             
     managerial   0.303 6.01  0.212 6.74  0.295 4.94  0.246 10.06
     professional  0.227 3.58  0.189 5.58  0.202 2.20  0.128 5.12
     technical  0.230 4.50  0.095 2.72  0.206 3.73  0.058 2.31
     craft   0.083 1.71  -0.084 -2.68  0.076 1.30  -0.028 -1.17
     personal   -0.083 -1.51  -0.277 -5.38  -0.006 -0.08  -0.145 -2.75
     sales   0.041 0.49  -0.276 -6.27  -0.060 -0.68  -0.083 -2.47
     operative   -0.090 -1.29  -0.223 -6.74  -0.209 -2.25  -0.157 -6.42
     unskilled  -0.205 -4.23  -0.363 -9.59  -0.175 -2.27  -0.255 -8.73
constant  1.564 29.34  1.579 37.15  1.654 24.06  1.700 47.40
             
observations     1489    5206    1489    5206
R-squared   0.5147   0.5149   0.7427   0.7647
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Table 3. Decomposing the earnings gap.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: WERS 2004. In each case the contribution of each group of variables is 
evaluated using the parameters from the model for the public sector. All figures  
are expressed in log-percentage points. 
  
Earnings gap -11.73% 
  
(i) Baseline  
Differences in characteristics -8.01% 
Occupation -2.42% 
Unexplained -1.29% 
  
  
(ii) including workplace specific fixed effects  
Differences in characteristics -8.59% 
Occupation -4.46% 
Workplace 3.10% 
Unexplained -1.77% 
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Table 4. Interquantile differences for the public sector. 
log hourly pay  q20  q40  q50  q60  q80 
  coeff t-value  coeff t-value  coeff t-value  coeff t-value  coeff t-value
potential experience (years)  0.019 4.07  0.019 3.39  0.025 4.75  0.026 5.77  0.023 3.27
potential experience sqd. (x103)  -0.292 -3.49  -0.258 -2.47  -0.363 -3.61  -0.375 -4.37  -0.348 -2.49
training (days in previous year)  0.000 -0.02  0.003 1.15  0.003 1.01  0.001 0.54  -0.001 -0.24
education none/other is omitted              
     cse25  0.037 1.14  0.061 1.60  0.039 1.16  0.052 1.21  0.032 0.72
     cse1  0.074 2.24  0.126 5.32  0.119 4.57  0.122 3.97  0.119 3.15
     ceae  0.088 1.39  0.189 4.84  0.149 3.15  0.169 2.57  0.113 2.99
     ce2ae  0.184 4.91  0.222 4.79  0.232 4.95  0.205 5.06  0.197 4.99
    degree  0.205 4.39  0.292 7.12  0.310 10.57  0.300 10.08  0.271 7.16
    postgrad  0.391 9.71  0.412 7.93  0.403 10.61  0.413 10.37  0.340 9.27
vocational qualification  0.020 0.91  0.031 1.37  0.028 1.48  0.039 2.75  0.048 1.95
child 0-18  -0.005 -0.26  0.021 0.95  0.008 0.39  0.033 1.63  0.073 2.86
married  0.074 4.49  0.076 3.12  0.080 3.63  0.068 3.33  0.063 2.46
disabled  -0.035 -1.15  -0.004 -0.11  -0.019 -0.66  -0.036 -1.39  -0.031 -1.01
ethnic  0.027 0.46  0.078 1.16  0.102 2.00  0.099 2.80  0.113 2.31
fixed contract  0.050 0.94  0.050 1.03  0.090 1.72  0.073 1.39  0.078 1.10
tenure  0.016 5.36  0.013 3.25  0.012 3.31  0.009 2.69  0.009 3.08
union  -0.008 -0.42  0.012 0.44  0.021 0.89  0.021 0.93  0.013 0.30
clerical is omitted                
    managerial   0.280 6.27  0.337 6.97  0.311 7.59  0.291 6.38  0.372 7.41
    professional  0.332 8.00  0.302 5.97  0.276 6.02  0.264 5.45  0.305 5.89
    technical  0.306 10.18  0.313 9.84  0.285 8.13  0.250 6.81  0.236 7.90
    craft   0.090 3.20  0.068 2.25  0.059 1.43  0.021 0.47  0.004 0.09
    personal   -0.143 -2.66  -0.107 -2.31  -0.076 -1.42  -0.121 -2.27  -0.083 -1.81
    sales   0.005 0.02  0.096 0.49  0.047 0.32  0.014 0.09  -0.086 -0.32
    operative   -0.031 -0.59  0.008 0.21  -0.020 -0.47  -0.072 -1.47  0.002 0.04
    unskilled  -0.188 -7.13  -0.144 -4.26  -0.162 -4.24  -0.217 -5.79  -0.248 -5.66
constant  1.421 27.19  1.458 24.04  1.483 26.66  1.562 33.48  1.772 22.63
                
No. observations   1489   1489   1489   1489   1489
Pseudo R2    0.3174   0.3428   0.3473   0.3514   0.3373
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Table 5. Interquantile differences for the private sector.   
log hourly pay  q20  q40  q50  q60  q80 
  coeff t-value  coeff t-value  coeff t-value  coeff t-value  coeff t-value
potential experience (years)  0.030 11.82  0.027 8.60  0.026 10.29  0.027 11.97  0.027 9.04
potential experience sqd. (x103)  -0.475 -10.64  -0.405 -6.62  -0.395 -7.31  -0.413 -9.05  -0.415 -6.82
training (days in previous year)  0.003 1.12  0.006 2.35  0.008 3.32  0.009 4.67  0.010 4.76
education none/other is omitted             
     cse25  0.082 4.37  0.088 5.06  0.082 3.44  0.083 3.52  0.106 5.21
     cse1  0.144 6.60  0.135 6.65  0.126 6.85  0.117 5.74  0.141 6.04
     ceae  0.113 3.88  0.159 5.01  0.177 4.76  0.165 5.95  0.163 4.30
     ce2ae  0.257 7.53  0.268 8.07  0.240 8.34  0.238 7.12  0.281 8.55
    degree  0.376 21.64  0.426 27.85  0.400 19.22  0.394 16.93  0.402 15.71
    postgrad  0.559 14.41  0.570 23.81  0.562 21.49  0.511 17.97  0.483 14.74
vocational qualification  0.031 3.17  0.034 3.06  0.035 3.39  0.023 2.46  0.019 1.60
child 0-18  0.022 1.60  0.011 0.87  0.018 1.26  0.024 1.91  0.035 2.96
married  0.100 6.97  0.092 8.10  0.091 6.07  0.085 5.16  0.079 3.62
disabled  -0.030 -1.42  -0.012 -0.62  -0.008 -0.45  -0.008 -0.60  0.010 0.47
ethnic  -0.091 -3.74  -0.074 -4.45  -0.080 -3.22  -0.068 -2.18  -0.043 -1.33
fixed contract  -0.157 -1.65  -0.111 -1.58  -0.098 -1.75  -0.092 -1.60  -0.073 -1.15
tenure  0.013 5.57  0.012 7.27  0.012 7.57  0.011 5.98  0.011 4.03
union  0.039 2.39  0.037 2.87  0.053 3.68  0.054 4.72  0.065 5.13
clerical is omitted                
    managerial   0.235 7.69  0.316 8.65  0.287 7.11  0.292 10.66  0.233 7.60
    professional  0.212 5.66  0.241 6.63  0.197 5.20  0.207 8.40  0.166 5.47
    technical  0.067 2.10  0.129 4.29  0.082 2.21  0.082 3.01  0.097 2.56
    craft   -0.026 -1.14  -0.003 -0.11  -0.054 -1.54  -0.072 -3.41  -0.118 -3.23
    personal   -0.273 -8.98  -0.264 -5.16  -0.316 -5.50  -0.323 -5.50  -0.289 -2.83
    sales   -0.236 -6.12  -0.224 -5.48  -0.244 -4.79  -0.242 -5.26  -0.280 -4.21
    operative   -0.179 -8.36  -0.141 -4.43  -0.210 -5.71  -0.227 -8.91  -0.279 -7.36
    unskilled  -0.289 -12.55  -0.253 -7.37  -0.303 -8.13  -0.323 -13.10  -0.369 -12.63
constant  1.262 33.31  1.419 24.39  1.560 30.46  1.653 40.24  1.862 33.74
                
No. observations   5206   5206   5206   5206   5206
Pseudo R2    0.2831   0.3201   0.3332   0.345   0.3415
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Table 6. Interquantile differences. 
 public sector  private sector 
log hourly pay q80-q20  q90-q10  q80-q20  q90-q10 
 ∆ coeff t-value  ∆ coeff t-value  ∆ coeff t-value  ∆ coeff t-value
potential experience (years) 0.004 0.66  0.004 0.52  -0.003 -0.80  -0.004 -0.75
potential experience sqd. (x103) -0.037 -0.29  -0.049 -0.32  -0.060 0.95  -0.122 1.05
training (days in previous year) -0.001 -0.22  -0.006 -1.25  0.007 2.84  0.009 1.84
education none/other is omitted            
     cse25 -0.005 -0.11  0.053 0.75  0.023 0.77  0.039 0.85
     cse1 0.044 1.17  0.031 0.56  -0.004 -0.12  0.019 0.55
     ceae 0.025 0.46  0.068 0.70  0.050 1.26  -0.056 -0.78
     ce2ae 0.013 0.31  0.001 0.01  0.025 0.85  0.091 1.62
    degree 0.066 1.06  0.036 0.54  0.026 0.79  0.055 1.13
    postgrad -0.051 -0.78  0.020 0.26  -0.075 -1.49  -0.064 -1.17
vocational qualification 0.028 1.00  0.079 2.23  -0.011 -0.73  -0.041 -1.36
child 0-18 0.078 2.09  0.064 1.64  0.013 0.58  -0.003 -0.10
married -0.011 -0.44  0.006 0.15  -0.021 -1.17  -0.030 -1.06
disabled 0.005 0.17  -0.005 -0.11  0.040 1.59  -0.006 -0.20
ethnic 0.086 1.42  0.076 0.66  0.048 1.10  0.090 1.89
fixed contract 0.028 0.40  0.054 0.53  0.084 1.06  0.275 1.35
tenure -0.007 -1.98  -0.012 -2.24  -0.002 -1.05  -0.001 -0.26
union 0.021 0.59  -0.025 -0.58  0.026 1.28  0.005 0.16
clerical is omitted 0.092 1.48  0.032 0.50  -0.001 -0.03  -0.006 -0.10
    managerial  -0.028 -0.43  -0.035 -0.41  -0.046 -1.08  -0.124 -2.10
    professional -0.070 -1.28  -0.091 -1.80  0.030 0.58  0.010 0.17
    technical            
    craft  -0.086 -1.41  -0.203 -2.36  -0.092 -1.75  -0.107 -1.70
    personal  0.060 0.88  0.069 0.81  -0.016 -0.22  -0.001 -0.01
    sales  -0.091 -0.30  0.373 1.06  -0.044 -0.63  -0.040 -0.52
    operative  0.033 0.30  0.115 1.06  -0.101 -2.57  -0.139 -1.92
    unskilled -0.060 -1.13  -0.133 -1.81  -0.081 -2.30  -0.112 -1.71
constant 0.351 3.79  0.660 5.55  0.600 8.86  0.913 11.93
            
No. observations  1489   1489   5206   5206
Pseudo R2  q80 0.337  q90 0.317  q80 0.342  q90 0.311
Pseudo R2  q20 0.317  q10 0.284  q20 0.283  q10 0.249
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Appendix Table A1.     Variable definitions. 
Variable name  Variable definition 
   
hourly pay  Average hourly pay [midpoints of 14 bands, between 1 and 100] 
potential experience (years) Age minus (approximate years of schooling plus 5), measured in years. 
training (days in previous year) Days of training in the previous twelve months [midpoints of 6 bars, top coded at 10 days] 
education measures;    
     none  Has none of the academic qualifications listed 
     other  Has other academic qualifications than those listed 
     cse25  Highest level of education is GCSE grades D-G; CSE grades 2-5 SCE; O grades D-; SCE Standard grades 4-7. 
     cse1 
 
Highest level of education is GCSE grades A-C; GCE O-level passes; CSE grade 1 SCE; O grades A-C; or SCE 
Standard 1-3 
    gceae  Highest level of education is GCE A-level grades A-E; 1-2 SCE; Higher grades A-C, As levels  
    gce2ae Highest level of education is 2 or more GCE; A-levels grades A-E; 3 or more SCE; or Higher grades A-C  
    degree Highest level of education is a first degree, eg BSc, BA, HND, HNC Ma at first degree level 
    postgrad Highest level of education is a higher degree, eg MSc, MA, PGCE, PhD 
child  Has a dependent child aged below 18  
married  Married or living with a partner  
disabled  Has a long term (>1 year) illness/disability  
ethnic 
 
Employee considers they are white and black Caribbean; white and black African; white and Asian;  any other mixed 
background; Indian; Pakistani; Bangladeshi; any other Asian background; Caribbean; African; any other black 
background; Chinese; or any other ethnic group. 
fixed contract  Employed on a fixed term contract  
hours  Usual hours worked per week (includes over time)  
standard hours  Usual  hours worked per week minus over time  
overtime hours  Usual Overtime Hours per Week 
full time Working full time,  if standard working hours is greater than 36 
tenure   Years at this workplace [midpoints of  5 bars, top coded at 10 years] 
union   Employee is a union member  
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Variable name  Variable definition 
   
occupation categories;   
     managerial    Managerial 
     professional    Professional 
     technical   Technical 
     clerical   Clerical  
     craft    Craft service 
     personal    Personal service 
     sales    Sales and customer services 
     operative    Operative and assembly workers 
     unskilled   Unskilled  
     
public sector 
 
The formal status of this establishment (or the organisation) is described as: government-owned limited 
company / nationalised industry/T); public service agency; other non-trading public corporation; quasi 
autonomous national government organisation (QUANGO); local/central government (inc. NHS and Local 
Education Authorities). 
private sector 
 
The formal status of this establishment (or the organisation) is described as: public limited company (plc); 
private limited company; company limited by guarantee; partnership (inc. limited liability partnership/self-
prop); trust / charity; body established by royal charter; co-operative / mutual / friendly society.  
    
 
